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Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra
7.1    Introduction
Understanding the drivers of productivity diﬀerences across areas is cru-
cial to designing eﬀective public policies to promote growth and eﬃcient 
use of resources. Knowledge spillovers and economies of scale may be key 
causes of diﬀerences in productivity across space. The agglomeration econo-
mies literature explores the positive link between productivity and city size 
or density: cities, by virtue of their density, may facilitate the generation, 
transmission, and acquisition of new ideas. This is the Marshallian notion 
of “knowledge spillovers,” where one’s neighbors inﬂ  uence one’s adoption 
of new technologies so that cities should be more productive places. Most of 
this research, however, focuses on aggregate productivity measures, such as 
average income. These measures can be both crude and aﬀected by common 
local factors, such as price levels, which makes it diﬃcult to discern from 
them the mechanisms that drive productivity diﬀerences.
In this chapter, we explore the drivers of diﬀerences in medical sector pro-
ductivity to understand agglomeration economies better—particularly, the 
role that information spillovers play in making some places more productive. 
The medical sector is one of the largest in the U.S. economy (comprising 17 
percent of gross domestic product in 2008) and exhibits dramatic diﬀerences 
in productivity across space. The enormous variation in the quantity and 
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quality of care received by patients in diﬀerent geographic areas is not just 
due to diﬀerent health insurance coverage or patient characteristics. Even 
within Medicare, the public insurance program for the elderly that provides 
relatively uniform incentives to providers and patients, there is enormous 
geographic variation in the use of productive and unproductive health care 
(Dartmouth Atlas Project). Some of this variation occurs at the level of 
hospital referral regions (HRRs), which are empirically deﬁ  ned markets for 
health care, but a large portion may occur within these regions. In Baicker 
and Chandra (2004a), we demonstrate that areas with the highest quality 
care are often not the areas that spend the most intensively on health care: 
in states where Medicare spends more on beneﬁ  ciaries, they are less likely 
to receive high-  quality care. Furthermore, it is not the case that areas that 
“do more” do more of everything. Rather, U.S. health care is character-
ized by variation in both the overuse of intensive, costly care that is often 
of dubious clinical beneﬁ  t (Fisher et al. 2003a, 2003b) and the underuse of 
eﬀective, high- quality care, such as the administration of beta- blockers after 
heart attacks, mammograms for older women, inﬂ  uenza vaccines, and eye 
exams for diabetics. These underused procedures are relatively inexpensive, 
are known to have signiﬁ  cant medical beneﬁ  ts, and are rarely contraindi-
cated. Whether cities are better are avoiding the problems of underuse and 
overuse in health care is not known. The combined evidence on the overuse 
of dubious care and the underuse of eﬀective care strongly suggests the 
opportunity for productivity improvements in health care.
While ideally, all patients would receive the highest possible quality of 
care, in the presence of variation in care, there may be spillover beneﬁ  ts to 
any particular hospital providing higher-  quality care: one hospital’s invest-
ment in quality might drive learning across organizations, improving the 
quality of care provided in neighboring hospitals. By the same token, the 
use of ﬁ  nancially lucrative interventions of dubious therapeutic value may 
diﬀuse through a similar process. Prior work in other industries suggests 
that organizations often learn from each other and that innovations at one 
company can drive similar innovations in its neighbors. While this potential 
learning mechanism has been found in many settings, however, it remains 
largely unexplored in understanding changes in health care quality. Whether 
that occurs in clinical care and whether high-  performing hospitals drive 
improvements in care among neighbors is largely unknown.
Understanding the primary sources of variation in quality and the role 
that learning might play in driving improvements is critically important in 
developing eﬀective public policies: policymakers will be best able to craft 
interventions that enhance the productivity of American health care spend-
ing if they understand the factors that cause some hospitals to lag behind 
and the channels through which they might catch up. For example, if the 
variation in care occurs primarily at the hospital level, understanding the 
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aﬀect the quality of care can help target interventions toward those organi-
zations where improvements are most needed. If the variation is primarily 
regional, other approaches will be needed. Finally, understanding the role 
that learning plays can provide insight into policies that might optimize the 
quality of care delivered across an entire community: if quality enhance-
ments at one hospital are adopted by others, then this positive externality 
might suggest that it would be optimal to subsidize the investment in qual-
ity. On the other hand, if utilization of more expensive but lower-  value 
care also diﬀuses though a similar learning process, then policies might 
aim to discourage hospital investments in technologically intensive care 
of dubious value. In order to better understand the roles of variation and 
learning in the hospital setting, we seek to answer three questions. First, 
how much variation in hospital care (measured by both quality and the 
use of low-  value care) is due to diﬀerences across regions versus diﬀerences 
within regions? Second, how much of the variation within and across 
regions can be explained by readily identiﬁ  able factors? And ﬁ  nally, what 
is the role of agglomeration in generating quality? Is there evidence that 
the quality of care in an institution is inﬂ  uenced by the care at neighboring 
institutions?
7.2    Background
There is a vast economic literature on diﬀusion of innovation (e.g., 
Jovanovic and Nyarko 1995, 1996); see Hall (2004) for a recent survey and 
synthesis. Nearly all of these economic models posit that diﬀusion evolves 
as a proﬁ  t-  maximizing strategy, such as because some producers are wait-
ing for the price of the innovation to drop, or because they had invested in 
the previous technology, or because of capital-  labor complementarity. For 
example, Zucker, Darby, and Brewer (1998) link the timing of entry and 
location of biotechnology ﬁ  rms to the presence of academics that publish 
in basic science journals, while Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) 
document that inventors tend to cite patents that were developed in the same 
geographic region. In medical care, there is a large literature on knowledge 
spillovers, beginning with Coleman, Katz, and Menzel (1957), who found 
that doctors who were more integrated with colleagues were the ﬁ  rst to 
adopt a new drug.
In a world where the barriers to adoption are ﬁ  nancial, individual health 
providers each make decisions about whether to adopt the new innovation. 
Their incentives to adopt the innovation depend critically on the nature of 
their own perceived production function—which in turn reﬂ  ects how rap-
idly they themselves absorb new clinical evidence on treatments—and the 
ﬁ  nancial structure and rewards of the innovation. When the innovation is 
both ﬁ  nancially remunerative and perceived to be highly eﬀective, the speed 
of adoption will be rapid; as, for example, the rapid diﬀusion of tetracy-214        Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra
cline in the 1950s, documented in the classic Coleman, Katz, and Mendel 
study (1957). If there are few economic incentives to adopt, as in the case of 
beta-  blockers for the treatment of heart attacks, then diﬀusion will depend 
almost entirely on the extent to which individual perceptions of physicians 
change over time (Skinner and Staiger 2006). In other words, one needs to 
consider the convergence of physician-  speciﬁ  c production functions fj(t), 
where t is time, toward the “true” production function f∗. This is similar to 
how diﬀusion is modeled in the sociological literature (Rogers 1995), where 
the emphasis is not on economic factors or proﬁ  t maximizing but instead 
on a cultural or intrinsic inability to perceive the beneﬁ  ts of new technol-
ogies, despite evidence of their eﬀectiveness. Parente and Prescott (1994) 
have focused on the importance of relatively minor diﬀerences in barriers 
to technology adoption in explaining diﬀerences in income growth across 
countries. This view emphasizes the view that cross-  country diﬀerences 
in productivity arise from variation in technology adoption (Comin and 
Hobijn 2004).
There is certainly historical precedent for the inexplicably slow adop-
tion of new medical innovations, and Donald Berwick (2003) has written 
a remarkable account of why this may be the case. In 1601, Captain James 
Lancaster administered lemon juice to the crew of just one of his ﬂ  eet of 
four ships. Halfway through the trip, 40 percent of the sailors in the “con-
trol” ships had died of scurvy compared to no deaths in the “treatment” 
ship. Despite the strength of the evidence and aﬀordability of the interven-
tion, citrus fruits became required for British Navy sailors only in 1795, a 
mere 194 years after Lancaster’s trial. Perhaps even more striking is Joseph 
Lister’s recommendation that surgeons wash their hands, use gloves, and 
swab wounds with carbonic acid (Lister 1867). Lister acknowledged that 
his research was inﬂ  uenced by the Austrian physician Ignaz Semmelweis. 
Semmelweis demonstrated that maternal mortality from puerperal fever 
(an infection of the genital tract after giving birth) could be reduced from 
12.2 percent to 2.4 percent by making physicians wash their hands with 
chlorinated lime between autopsy and obstetrical rotations. That Semmel-
weis did not “have a model” (which in medical parlance would correspond to 
a germ theory of disease to explain his results) is thought to have contributed 
to the medical establishment’s reluctance to embrace his ﬁ  ndings.
It is even more diﬃcult to explain in standard economic models the leth-
argy with which some pernicious treatments are dropped: Heidenrich and 
McClellan (2001) found that a substantial fraction of the improvement 
in survival for heart attacks could be explained by the gradual decline in 
the use of lidocaine, a treatment that actually tended to increase mortality. 
More recently, a randomized control trial found that providing information 
to “opinion leaders” in a hospital resulted in large increases in the use of 
appropriate medications following heart attacks and decreases in the use of 
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in diﬀusion because of intrinsic diﬀerences in abilities of physicians (as in 
Jovanovich and Nyarko [1995, 1996]).
In summary, the adoption and use of health care innovations will be 
inﬂ  uenced by ﬁ  nancial rewards, the perceived beneﬁ  t from the innovation, 
and organizational structure. Low- value care of dubious clinical beneﬁ  t may 
be adopted quickly if economic incentives encourage adoption. High- value 
treatment may not be adopted without ﬁ  nancial incentives or if the eﬃcacy 
of the treatment is diﬃcult to observe. The sociological factors that moder-
ate these channels may vary based on physician or hospital characteristics.
The degree to which diﬀerent factors aﬀect the level and diﬀusion of best 
and worst practices is an inherently empirical question. We turn next to the 
data that we will bring to bear in exploring the nature of variation in the 
utilization of high-  quality and low-  value care.
7.3    Data
Our analysis requires hospital-  level measures of both high-  quality and 
low- value care. Because we will be performing analysis at the hospital rather 
than patient level, it is important that we construct measures of each that are 
not contaminated by unobserved patient characteristics such as severity of 
illness—especially if those patient characteristics are likely to be correlated 
across hospitals within a geographic area.
To measure high-  value health care, we use hospital compliance with a 
number of technical “process of care” measures. These measures use samples 
of patient discharge records for the treatment and capture interventions 
“for which there is strong scientiﬁ  c evidence and professional consensus 
that the process of care either directly improves outcomes or is a necessary 
step in a chain of care that does so,” such as the prescription of warfarin 
for atrial ﬁ  brillation or biennial eye examination for diabetics (U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services; Jha et al. 2005). The advantage of these measures is that detailed 
risk adjustment (based on how sick a hospital’s patient pool is) is not criti-
cal, as few patients are contraindicated for these procedures. The inability 
to perform high- quality risk adjustment at the hospital level is the principal 
reason that many other direct measures of quality, such as survival or the 
use of intensive interventions such as rescue angioplasty after a heart attack, 
are not utilized in this literature.
To construct a measure of the utilization of low-  value care, we follow 
previous work that suggests that hospital expenditures on Medicare ben-
eﬁ  ciaries at the end of life can proxy for this high-  intensity, low-  beneﬁ  t 
spending. These measures abstract from confounders such as unobserved 
illness by focusing on the set of patients who are terminally ill. Fisher et al. 
(2003a, 2003b) established that this end-  of-  life (EOL) spending is pervasive 
in areas that have a lot of beds, specialists, and health care facilities. They 216        Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra
have also demonstrated that higher EOL spending does not improve patient 
outcomes or satisfaction. Finally, this work has shown a correlation between 
a hospital’s EOL spending and its treatment of acute conditions such as hip 
fracture and acute myocardial infarction (AMI), suggesting that hospitals 
treat many diﬀerent patients with similar intensity. We next describe both 
measures in greater detail.
7.3.1    Measuring  High-  Value  Care
The Hospital Quality Alliance, a public- private collaboration between the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and several hospital 
organizations, began reporting individual hospitals’ performance on select 
process- of- care measures through an on- line Web site, “Hospital Compare,” 
on April 1, 2005; See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, CMS, 
and Jha et al. (2005) for details. These measures focus on three major con-
ditions for which evidence-  based treatments are supported by a solid body 
of evidence: acute myocardial infarction, pneumonia, and congestive heart 
failure (CHF). We analyzed data from 2004 to 2006, as 2004 is the ﬁ  rst full 
year of reported data on these measures. We chose to retain only those mea-
sures for which a majority of hospitals reported at least twenty- ﬁ  ve observa-
tions, a cutoﬀ used in previous work to ensure suﬃcient statistical precision. 
Eleven process measures yielded at least twenty-  ﬁ  ve observations for a ma-
jority of hospitals: Aspirin at arrival and at discharge and beta-  blocker 
prescription at arrival and at discharge (for AMI patients); assessment 
of left ventricular function, the provision of discharge instructions, and 
angiotensin-  converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitor or angiotensin receptor 
blocker (ARB) prescription for patients with left ventricular systolic dys-
function (LVSD; for CHF patients); blood culture performed before receiv-
ing the ﬁ  rst antibiotic in the hospital, ﬁ  rst dose of antibiotics within four 
hours of admission, initial antibiotic selected appropriately, and assessment 
of arterial oxygenation within twenty-  four hours of arrival (for pneumo-
nia patients). We computed quality scores for 6,917 hospital-  year obser-
vations.
To create condition-  speciﬁ  c quality scores for AMI, pneumonia, and 
CHF, we used a common methodology prescribed by the Joint Commis-
sion, which suggests a summary score calculated as the sum of the number 
of times a hospital performed the appropriate action across all measures for 
that condition (numerator), divided by the number of “opportunities” the 
hospital had to provide appropriate care (denominator). Composite scores 
were only calculated if a hospital had at least twenty- ﬁ  ve patients for at least 
one measure in that condition. We also calculated an overall quality measure 
that used information for all three clinical conditions by taking the mean of 
summary scores across conditions for each hospital. (As a speciﬁ  cation test, 
we also used factor analysis to combine the three composite measures for 
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average was 0.98, so we used the average.) We thus have four measures of the 
quality of care: the condition- speciﬁ  c scores for AMI, pneumonia, and CHF 
patients, and the composite score that aggregates these three. The correla-
tions between the condition- speciﬁ  c scores and the composite- quality score 
were 0.62 for heart attacks (AMI), 0.82 for congestive heart failure (CHF), 
and 0.77 for pneumonia. We focus primarily on the composite measure in 
our analysis, but results using the component measure are similar and are 
summarized next.
7.3.2    Measuring  Low-  Value  Spending
Our measure of the use of high-  intensity but low-  value care is based on 
the intensity of inpatient care for Medicare beneﬁ  ciaries in the six months 
preceding death (EOL). By focusing on variation in the treatment of patients 
with identical life expectancies, the EOL spending measure better reﬂ  ects the 
portion of spending that is attributable to diﬀerences in practice patterns 
as opposed to diﬀerences in severity of illnesses. End-  of-  life expenditures 
have been shown to be highly correlated with both total Medicare spending 
and spending for speciﬁ  c disease cohorts. Another advantage of focusing on 
EOL spending is that the sample size is large enough to calculate measures 
at the hospital level.
To construct our measure of EOL spending, we used Medicare part A 
(hospital) and part B (outpatient) spending and utilization data for hospital 
and physician services for chronically ill Medicare beneﬁ  ciaries who died 
during the years 1999 to 2003. At death, each of these patients was assigned 
to the hospital in which he or she had received the majority of care in the 
previous six months. All of the expenditure and utilization data from that 
patient’s claims were then assigned to that hospital. The vast majority of 
patients’ care occurred at the assigned hospital; the average percent of inpa-
tient days spent at the assigned hospital was 89.6 percent. Spending data 
were adjusted for diﬀerences in age, sex, race, and the relative frequency of 
chronic illness among the beneﬁ  ciaries studied.
7.3.3      Hospital and Area Characteristics
We linked the hospital- level quality and EOL data to the American Hospi-
tal Association Annual Survey Database that has information on each hos-
pital’s nurse- to- patient (Census) ratio, proﬁ  t status (public, not for proﬁ  t, for 
proﬁ  t), membership in the Council of Teaching Hospitals, bed size, location 
(region, county, health referral region [described next], and urban versus 
rural), percentage of Medicare and Medicaid patients, and presence of a 
medical intensive care unit. Nurse/ Census ratios were calculated by dividing 
the number of full-  time equivalent nurses on staﬀ by 1,000 patient days.
We used each hospital’s county to link these data to area- level population 
characteristics from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
Health Resources and Services Administration Area Resource File. This 218        Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra
data set contains information on residents’ characteristics, such as educa-
tion, race, income, and age. It also contains information on county-  level 
health care providers, such as the number of physicians broken down by 
specialty practicing in the county.
7.3.4    Deﬁ  ning Geographic Areas
To construct local markets for health care, we adopt the methodology 
of the “Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care,” which divides the United States 
into 306 hospital referral regions (HRRs) based on attributing zip codes 
to HRRs by the use of an algorithm reﬂ  ecting commuting patterns and 
the location of major referral hospitals. The HRRs may cross state and 
county borders, because they are determined solely by migration patterns of 
patients. For example, the Evansville, Indiana HRR encompasses parts of 
three states, because it draws patients so heavily from Illinois and Kentucky. 
The HRRs are best viewed as the level at which tertiary services such as car-
diac surgeries are received (although they are not necessarily the appropriate 
geographical level for primary care services).
Analysis at the HRR level is preferable to analysis at the city or state 
level, since it uses the empirical pattern of patient commuting to determine 
the geographic boundaries of each referral region rather than assuming 
that the arbitrary political boundaries of states and cities also deﬁ  ne the 
level at which the health care is delivered. Furthermore, for the purpose of 
studying geographic productivity spillovers, an analysis at the HRR level is 
superior to one at the level of the individual hospital for two reasons. First, 
patients can be assigned to an HRR based on their residence rather than on 
the hospital at which they received treatment (which may be endogenous). 
In addition, productivity spillovers are likely to operate at a broader level 
than that of a given hospital; for example, these spillovers are expected to 
reach beyond the boundary of the ﬁ  rm to aﬀect productivity at all ﬁ  rms in a 
region. Physicians often have operating privileges in multiple hospitals and 
interact (socially and professionally) with other doctors who may or may 
not practice in their hospital, and patients are commonly referred to other 
hospitals within the HRR for treatment. The HRR encompasses a physi-
cian’s likely peers and a hospital’s natural competitors.
7.4      Agglomerations in High-  Value and Low-  Value Care
In the two panels of ﬁ  gure 7.1, we illustrate the degree of variation at the 
hospital level in high-  value, high-  quality care (panel A) and in the intensity 
of end-  of-  life, low-  value spending (panel B). In panel A, the quality mea-
sure used is the composite measure that puts equal weight on treatments for 
heart attacks, pneumonia, and congestive heart failure. In principal, this rate 
should ideally be close to 1 (100 percent) for all hospitals, as very few patients 
are contraindicated for the measures that comprise the quality index. Panel A
B
Fig. 7.1    Distribution of quality (panel A) and end-  of-  life spending (panel B) for 
Medicare patients in U.S. hospitals
Note: Quality measures refer to a composite measure of quality that puts equal weight on 
treatments for heart attacks, pneumonia, and congestive heart failure. Spending data is de-
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B shows the roughly log-  normal distribution of the use of technologically 
intensive, low-  value EOL care across hospitals.
Figure 7.1 illustrates the wide variability with which hospitals in the 
United States utilize eﬀective and ineﬀective care. This variation in hos-
pital utilization patterns is not constrained to particular small areas nor 
uniformly spread throughout the country: hospitals in some cities perform 
systematically better than those in others. Figure 7.2 illustrates variation 
in the use of both high-  quality and low-  value care across the twenty larg-
est HRRs in the United States. These HRRs comprise the largest cities in 
America—each has a number of teaching hospitals, and while it is possible 
that individual hospitals may diﬀer in the severity of their patient caseloads 
or the managerial expertise of their administrators, it is not obvious why 
Philadelphia should ex ante provide a lower level of care than Chicago or 
Pittsburgh. As panel A of this ﬁ  gure illustrates, the hospitals comprising 
the Philadelphia HRR score poorly on performance on standard quality 
measures, while their northern neighbors in Camden, New Jersey, do sub-
stantially better. Similarly, it is not entirely clear why the hospitals in the 
Los Angeles HRR, which serve high-  income patients and include places 
such as the University of California, Los Angeles, and Cedars Sinai, should 
perform so poorly relative to those next door in the Orange county HRR. In 
panel B of ﬁ  gure 7.2, we graph the analogous use of EOL spending across 
the twenty largest HRRs. There is similarly wide variation in the use of this 
form of technologically intensive medicine. Once again, there is no a priori 
reason to believe that some HRRs should be using these technologies more 
than others. Furthermore, casual inspection of the two panels does not sup-
port the conclusion that the use of high-   and low-  value care is correlated 
(either negatively or positively). This casual observation is conﬁ  rmed by the 
estimated (statistically insigniﬁ  cant) correlation coeﬃcient between the two 
measures across all HRRs of –  0.06.
Table 7.1 summarizes the key insights of ﬁ  gures 7.1 and 7.2. At the hospi-
tal level, we report the variation in hospital performance on the quality and 
EOL spending measures. Of particular interest are the last two columns of 
this table, which present analysis of variance decompositions of the extent 
to which the hospital-  level variation in ﬁ  gures 7.1 and 7.2 is accounted for 
by HRR factors. For the quality measures, between 17 and 20 percent of 
the hospital-  level variation is driven by HRR factors, leaving a substan-
tial amount of within variation. With EOL spending, the opposite is true: 
here, there is substantial between HRR variation in use, with HRR eﬀects 
accounting for over 70 percent of the hospital variation. This is another way 
of saying that when it comes to EOL spending, hospitals in the same HRR 
practice a similar type of medicine, resulting in agglomerations of regions 
where intensive medicine is practiced. But when it comes to quality, there is 
much more disagreement between providers, even those who are within the 
same HRR. In the following analysis, we will estimate regression models to A
A
Fig. 7.2    Distribution of quality (panel A) and end-  of-  life spending (panel B) for 
Medicare patients in the largest twenty HRRs
Note: Quality measures refer to a composite measure of quality that puts equal weight on 
treatments for heart attacks, pneumonia, and congestive heart failure. Spending data is de-
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better understand the drivers of between versus within variation. Means 
and standard deviations for the variables that we use as regressors are shown 
in table 7.2. While not reported, we also performed the decompositions in 
this table without weighting the analysis by the number of beds (thereby 
allowing smaller hospitals to exert as much inﬂ  uence as larger ones in the 
estimation of HRR eﬀects). The results from this unweighted analysis are 
almost identical to those reported in table 7.1, suggesting that the practice 
style of a particular hospital is orthogonal to its size.
These patterns motivate us to examine the correlates of high-   and low-
  value care across regions (an HRR-  level analysis, in table 7.3) and within 
regions (a hospital- level analysis with HRR ﬁ  xed eﬀects, in table 7.4). While 
these regression models should not be interpreted causally, they are a use-
ful framework within which to examine correlations that serve to motivate 
more formal theories of technology adoption and diﬀusion. To better under-
stand why some HRRs provide higher-  quality care, we use HRR-  level data 
and regress each HRR’s quality score on a number of covariates. The ﬁ  rst 
column of table 7.3 describes results for the use of our composite quality 
measure (a metric of low-  cost, high-  value care) and the second column for 
the use of EOL spending (a metric of high- cost, low- value care). Regression 
coeﬃcients and robust standard errors are presented. The covariates that we 
have used (including nine indicator variables for the Census regions) explain 
only 30 percent of the between- HRR variation in quality but over 70 percent 
of the between- HRR variation in EOL spending. Because we have included 
Census region ﬁ  xed eﬀects, our results are not driven by explanations that 
are unique to states in New England or the South, for example. Holding the 
composition of the physician workforce (the mix of specialists and general-
ists) constant, adding one more physician to an HRR raises quality but also 
Table 7.1  Hospital-   and HRR-  level variation in quality and end-  of-  life spending
Summary statistics Variance decomposition






to 95%)  
Variation between 
HRRs (%)  
Variation within 
HRRs (%)
High- value  care
  Heart  attack 92.50% 6.60% 80.0–99.3% 17 83
  Heart  failure 75.30% 16.10% 44.4–95.5% 17 83
  Pneumonia 82.10% 8.00% 68.3–94.0% 21 79
  Composite  score 82.40% 8.90% 66.5–94.3% 19 81
Low- value  care
  End-  of-  life  spending   $36k   $13k   $20.6–61.0k   72   28
Notes: Composite (quality) score refers to a composite measure of quality that puts equal weight on 
treatments for heart attacks, pneumonia, and congestive heart failure. Spending data is deﬂ  ated to 2006 
dollars. The analysis of variance decompositions in the last two columns are weighted by the number of 
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EOL spending. Interestingly, if we were to hold the size of the workforce 
constant and simply replace a generalist with a specialist, there would be 
no change in quality but a substantial increase in the use of EOL spending 
(consistent with some of our previous research). Also noteworthy is the fact 
that HRRs with a greater share of teaching hospitals perform substantially 
better on quality and are no more proﬂ  igate in their use of EOL care. Large 
cities are not more likely to oﬀer one type of care vis- à- vis smaller cities. But 
HRRs with larger shares of minority patients, less-  educated patients, and 
low- income patients (as measured by the percent receiving Medicaid) are all 
less likely to oﬀer high- quality care and slightly more likely to spend on EOL 
care. These ﬁ  ndings caution against the explanation that richer places spend 
more on EOL care simply because the marginal utility of health care in the 
end of life, however small, exceeds the marginal utility of other consumption 
(as in Hall and Jones [2007]).
In addition to the variation between HRRs in quality and the use of 
low-  value care, the variance decompositions in table 7.1 also hinted at sub-
stantial variation within areas, especially in the use of high-  quality care. To 
examine the correlates of this variation, in table 7.4, we estimate models with 
data at the hospital level that include HRR ﬁ  xed eﬀects, isolating within-
  HRR variation in quality and spending. Regression coeﬃcients and stan-
dard errors clustered at the HRR level are presented. In these regressions, 
it is not possible to control for the specialist composition of a hospital’s 
Table 7.2  Summary statistics
HRR- level  data Hospital- level  data
    Mean  
Standard 
deviation   Mean  
Standard 
deviation
Percent age  65 0.13 0.03 0.15 0.06
Percent  high school 0.19 0.06 0.21 0.11
In largest 100 cities 0.16 0.27 0.18 0.38
Publicly owned 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.38
Teaching hospital 0.14 0.19 0.09 0.28
Log(beds) 7.48 0.84 5.02 0.92
RNs per capita 1.25 0.27 1.21 0.66
Percent black 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.15
Percent Medicaid 0.20 0.07 0.18 0.14
Per capita MDs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Percent specialists 0.57 0.14 0.58 0.14
Overall quality 0.84 0.04 0.82 0.09
EOL spending   36.19   9.02   36.10   12.93
Notes: HRR refers to hospital referral regions as deﬁ  ned by the “Dartmouth Atlas of Health 
Care.” Covariates are from the American Hospital Association and the Area Resource File. 
Quality of care is from the Hospital Quality Association. End-  of-  life spending is from Medi-
care claims data. Data sources are described in more detail in the text.224        Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra
area, since that is a characteristic of the area that is absorbed by the HRR 
ﬁ  xed eﬀect. Table 7.4 shows that hospitals with a larger share of minority, 
poor, and less-  educated patients oﬀer lower-  quality care. Once again, it is 
important to note that our measures of quality do not require the presence 
of costly investments in new technology: these are primarily low- cost, high-
  value interventions. On the other hand, EOL spending, which is expensive 
and technologically intensive, is more likely to be oﬀered at hospitals that 
serve minority and less-  educated populations. It is surprising that teaching 
hospitals do not oﬀer higher-  quality care—some of this eﬀect is simply a 
consequence of their urban location, a large component of which we have 
Table 7.3  Association between composite quality, EOL spending, and 
HRR characteristics
HRR- level  regressions
    Overall quality  
Low- value 
EOL spending
Per capita total active nonfederal MDs 5.96 4,779.78
(2.90) (862.85)
Share of MDs who are specialists –0.04 12.05
(0.03) (4.61)
HRR in one of 100 largest cities –0.01 1.67
(0.01) (1.63)
Share of hospitals that are public (nonfederal) –0.01 –0.38
(0.01) (1.65)
Share of hospitals that are teaching hospitals 0.03 3.85
(0.01) (2.69)
Total beds of hospitals in HRR (log) –0.01 1.40
(0.00) (0.55)
Full-  time employed RNs per patient Census day 0.00 2.78
(0.01) (1.34)
Percent of patients who are black –0.04 18.36
(0.03) (4.80)
Share of inpatient days by Medicaid patients –0.01 –5.59
(0.05) (5.25)
Percent of population over age 65 0.00 –2.84
(0.06) (9.81)
Percent of population with less than high school –0.13 30.19
(0.05) (11.25)
Region dummies Yes Yes
R2 0.29 0.72
Observations   262   262
Notes: Regression coeﬃcients from between-  HRR regressions are shown, along with robust 
standard errors; HRR refers to hospital referral regions as deﬁ  ned by the “Dartmouth Atlas 
of Health Care.” Covariates are from the American Hospital Association and the Area Re-
source File. Quality of care is from the Hospital Quality Association. Composite quality is 
based on treatment for heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia patients. End- of- life spend-
ing is from Medicare claims data. Data sources are described in more detail in the text.Understanding Agglomerations in Health Care    2 2 5
adjusted for by controlling with an indicator variable for hospitals located 
in one of the largest one- hundred cities. This fact is consistent with the work 
of Fisher et al. (2004), who note substantial variations in the eﬃciency of 
academic medical centers. And contrary to many assertions in the literature, 
a greater presence of nurses does not seem to result in higher-  quality care 
being provided.
At the bottom of table 7.4, we note that these covariates explain only 25 
percent of the within-  HRR variation in quality but over 75 percent of the 
within-  HRR variation in EOL spending. So, while the provision of qual-
ity, even of the low-  cost, high-  value kind, may be a function of physician 
beliefs or idiosyncratic factors at the hospital level, the same explanation 
does not apply to the phenomena of using low-  value, high-  cost care. Here, 
Table 7.4  Association between composite quality, EOL spending, and hospital 
characteristics
Within- HRR  regressions





In one of 100 largest cities 0.01 3.63
(0.00) (0.69)
Public nonfederal hospital dummy –0.01 –1.17
(0.01) (0.42)
Teaching hospital dummy 0.00 2.99
(0.00) (0.76)
Log(hospital beds) 0.02 3.61
(0.00) (0.20)
Full-  time employed RNs per patient Census day 0.01 0.77
(0.00) (0.43)
Percent of patients who are black –0.09 8.96
(0.02) (2.12)
Share of inpatient days by Medicaid patients –0.02 –4.68
(0.01) (1.29)
Percent of zip over age 65 0.00 –4.57
(0.03) (3.74)
Percent of zip with less than high school –0.05 4.68
(0.02) (1.98)
Region dummies Yes Yes
R2 0.247 0.759
Observations   6,917   9,751
Notes: Regression coeﬃcients from within-  HRR regressions are shown, along with standard 
errors clustered at the HRR level; HRR refers to hospital referral regions as deﬁ  ned by the 
“Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care.” Covariates are from the American Hospital Association 
and the Area Resource File. Quality of care is from the Hospital Quality Association. Com-
posite quality is based on treatment for heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia patients. 
End-  of-  life spending is from Medicare claims data. Data sources are described in more detail 
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a basic set of hospital and HRR characteristics accounts for a large share 
of the variation.
7.5      The Role of Learning
These facts point to a world where the use of high- quality care is idiosyn-
cratically dispersed through the health care sector in ways that are uncor-
related with geographic region. Yet, geography at the level of the hospi-
tal market is a powerful descriptor of the use of low-  value care. But this 
(within-  region) variation in the use of high-  quality care also suggests an 
interesting hypothesis: if high-  quality hospitals are located right next to 
low- quality hospitals, do they learn from their high- quality neighbors? This 
question is extremely diﬃcult to resolve empirically, as demonstrated in 
the substantial “peer-  eﬀects” literature (Sacerdote 2001). Our goal is less 
ambitious—we simply ask if the evidence is consistent with learning, and we 
rely on the use of simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to explore 
the case for learning. We exploit the panel structure of our data to ask if 
investments in quality made by a hospital’s neighbors last year predict that 
hospital’s performance this year. The obvious concern with this approach 
is that investments in quality made by neighboring hospitals are correlated 
but do not causally aﬀect each other’s performance. To address this concern, 
we condition on a hospital’s own performance last year. In other words, 
we compare two hospitals with similar quality in a given year and ask if 
the one with higher-  quality neighbors improves by more than the one with 
lower- quality neighbors. We perform the parallel analysis for the use of EOL 
spending. The fact that quality and EOL spending are measured on separate 
scales makes it diﬃcult to compare the regression coeﬃcients on neighbors’ 
performance across these two diﬀerent outcomes. We address this concern 
by standardizing both variables (that is, we take each variable, subtract its 
mean, and divide by its standard deviation). These standardized variables 
are both mean 0 and variance 1 (z- scores).
We construct each hospital’s neighbors based on a composite of all other 
hospitals in the HRR. That is, neighbor quality for each hospital is just 
the average value of that variable for all of the other hospitals in the same 
HRR. Results using alternate speciﬁ  cations (such as choosing only the larg-
est nearby hospital as the neighbor or focusing on the best performing hos-
pital as the critical neighbor) produce very similar results.
Our exploration of the possibility of learning from neighbors is shown in 
table 7.5 (high-  quality care) and table 7.6 (low-  value end-  of-  life spending). 
We present regression coeﬃcients and standard errors clustered at the HRR 
level. In both tables, the ﬁ  rst four columns use the dependent variable Yit 
(composite quality or EOL spending) directly, while the last four columns 
substitute the standardized (z-  score) version of the dependent variable (to 
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column does not include neighbors’ performance, constraining the eﬀect to 
be zero. The second column adds in the performance of neighbors, and the 
third column adds the lagged dependent variable for a hospital’s own perfor-
mance in the previous year. With Xi denoting the characteristics of hospital i, 
N–  it the performance of hospital i’s neighbors in year t, and Yi(t– 1) the lagged 
performance of hospital i, this last speciﬁ  cation is formally expressed as:
(1)  Yit    Xi  N	it  
Yi(t	1)  eit.
This speciﬁ  cation may understate the eﬀect of neighbors on performance, 
for it eﬀectively rules out any lagged neighbor eﬀect on current outcomes. 
Such an eﬀect is absorbed by the coeﬃcient 
, which through back substi-
tution can be shown to capture the role of lagged neighbor performance 
on contemporaneous outcomes. The identifying assumption here is that 
E(eit | Xi, N–  it, Yi(t– 1))  0 or that unobserved shocks to hospital performance 
aren’t predictable in controlling for hospital characteristics and lagged per-
formance (which includes lagged neighbors’ performance). In other words, 
we are assuming that there is not a common process that contemporaneously 
improves a hospital’s performance and that of its neighbors. This would be 
violated if, for example, a local quality improvement eﬀort was implemented 
and aﬀected a hospital and its neighbors or if hospitals and their neighbors 
were learning about a new technology from a common source. To begin to 
explore this possibility, in the fourth column, we instrument for neighbors’ 
performance using the characteristics of the neighbors that are described in 
table 7.3 (such as location in one of the largest one-  hundred cities, number 
of beds, specialist composition in the area, and patient characteristics). In 
this speciﬁ  cation, we are identifying the eﬀect of neighbors’ performance 
on a hospital’s performance by only utilizing variation in neighbors’ per-
formance that can be attributed to those neighbors’ attributes. This source 
of identiﬁ  cation is valid only insofar as those attributes are not correlated 
with unobserved characteristics that aﬀect both neighbors’ performance 
and the changes in a hospital’s own performance. In other words, we need 
the fact that a greater share of a hospital’s neighbors are teaching hospitals 
(for example) to be uncorrelated with the unobservable determinants of that 
hospital’s quality—having controlled for that hospital’s own teaching status 
and its quality performance last year. This assumption is untestable, but it 
becomes more diﬃcult to tell a story about the relationship being driven 
by unobservable common factors. Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to isolate a 
source of variation that is not subject to similar concerns.
We present results both for the simple composite quality measure and 
for the standardized measures. It is easiest to compare coeﬃcient estimates 
across these speciﬁ  cations in the panels on the right, since the variables of 
interest are measured in similar units. Examining column (6) of table 7.5, 
we see that a 1 standard deviation increase in neighbors’ quality raises a 
given hospital’s quality score by 0.46 standard deviations. As noted ear-232        Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra
lier, this eﬀect probably overstates the eﬀect of neighbors on learning. In 
column (7), where we control for own performance last year, the eﬀect of 
a hospital’s neighbors having quality that is 1 standard deviation higher 
quality than average (a z-  score of 1, with mean equal to 0 by construction) 
is an increase in quality of 0.16 standard deviations (our preferred speciﬁ  ca-
tion). The instrumental variable (IV) results in column (8) cannot reject the 
OLS estimates. This is not the consequence of weak instruments: the ﬁ  rst 
stage of our two-  stage least squares regression has an F-  statistic of 45.
The analogous results for EOL spending are reported in table 7.6. Here, 
having neighbors whose EOL spending is 1 standard deviation higher raises 
a hospital’s EOL spending by 0.70 (column [6]) standard deviations when 
we do not include a lagged dependent variable and 0.17 standard deviations 
(column [7]—our preferred speciﬁ  cation) when we do. These are large spill-
over eﬀects. In this case, the IV results are virtually identical to our preferred 
OLS speciﬁ  cation—column (8) suggests that having neighbors whose EOL 
spending is 1 standard deviation higher raises a hospital’s own EOL spend-
ing by 0.14 standard deviations.
The magnitude of learning is thus quite similar across the two outcomes. 
This might seem at odds with the fact that there is much more variation 
within HRRs in quality than in EOL care—a phenomenon that may cause 
one to think that there is greater within-  earning with EOL spending. But 
it is possible for learning to occur for quality and EOL spending at similar 
rates even while there is less within-  area variation in EOL spending if there 
is faster innovation in low- value EOL care. This seems consistent with highly 
intensive care being based on adoption of the latest rapidly developing tech-
nology, while most of the quality measures used here have been in existence 
for much longer.
We performed a number of speciﬁ  cation tests to rule out alternative expla-
nations. First, we also estimated models that included the lead (instead of 
or in addition to lag) of neighbors’ performance. Our concern was that if 
quality is noisily measured from year to year, it may be possible to see a 
correlation between neighbors’ scores last year and performance today. But 
a pure measurement error story would also imply a correlation between 
performance today and neighbors’ quality a year from today (a model that 
by construction cannot be causal). In general, we found that the largest 
eﬀects of neighbors’ performance loaded onto lagged performance (results 
available on request). This speciﬁ  cation check suggests that the associations 
identiﬁ  ed in these tables could be causal. As previously discussed, we also 
tested several other methods of constructing a hospital’s neighbors, which 
produced quite similar results. We also estimated a number of speciﬁ  cations 
with interaction eﬀects to explore whether certain hospitals (such as teach-
ing hospitals or publicly owned hospitals) had stronger spillover eﬀects on 
neighbors, but we were not able to estimate these second-  order eﬀects with Understanding Agglomerations in Health Care    2 3 3
enough precision. Last, instead of our composite measure of quality, we 
reestimated the model with the subcomponent measures (such as the treat-
ment of heart attack patients only), again with quite similar results. For 
example, the increase in standardized quality of treatment for heart attacks 
(using the IV speciﬁ  cation of column [8]) associated with a 1 point increase 
in neighbors’ quality is 0.19 (HRR-  clustered standard error 0.09) and for 
treatment of pneumonia is 0.11 (HRR- clustered standard error 0.07). While 
it is clearly still possible that our ﬁ  ndings are driven by alternative explana-
tions, these results are quite suggestive of agglomeration eﬀects.
7.6    Discussion
The measures that we have used are subject to several limitations. The ﬁ  rst 
is an aspect of the quality measures themselves, since quality measures may 
in theory penalize hospitals that treat sicker patients. While this concern may 
be true of quality measures for acute treatments (such as the use of angio-
plasty after heart attacks), the measures used in this chapter were chosen 
in part because they are not sensitive to the ability to perform detailed risk 
adjustment. Moreover, Higashi et al. (2007) have noted that patients with 
more comorbidities are no less likely to receive higher-  quality care of the 
type used in our quality measures.
Second, we examined process-  of-  care measures (such as use of beta-
  blockers) rather than outcome measures (such as mortality). Policymakers 
have focused on process-  of-  care measures because they are less sensitive 
to risk adjustment, but these measures recently have come under ﬁ  re, with 
some critics claiming that they do not actually predict health outcomes 
such as mortality after AMI and CHF (see, for example, the work of Bradley 
et al. [2006] and Werner and Bradlow [2006]. More recent work by Jha et al. 
(2007), however, has demonstrated that there is indeed a signiﬁ  cant posi-
tive relationship between performance on these measures and risk- adjusted 
survival rates for each of the three conditions measured here and that hos-
pitals with higher performance on these measures achieve better outcomes 
for their patients.
A third concern is the validity of the end-  of-  life measure: a very sick 
patient treated in a high-  intensity hospital may have an increased chance 
of survival and thus not end up in the end-  of-  life sample. Presumably, this 
individual experienced above-  average expenditures, thus excluding him or 
her from the sample and thus attenuating the measured diﬀerences in spend-
ing. Bach, Schrag, and Begg (2004) have also noted that regions with more 
“low- cost” diseases will appear to experience lower expenditures in the end-
  of-  life cohorts. However, our spending data have already been adjusted for 
the relative frequency of diseases in each hospital’s patient population, miti-
gating these concerns. Additionally, previous work has shown a correlation 234        Katherine Baicker and Amitabh Chandra
between a hospital’s EOL spending and its treatment of acute conditions 
such as hip fracture and AMI, suggesting that these hospitals treat many 
diﬀerent patients with similar intensity.
One might interpret these ﬁ  ndings in the context of Baicker and Chandra 
(2004a, 2004b) and Chandra and Staiger (2007). In this work, we argued 
that there are two types of health care—one technologically intensive and 
provided by specialists and the other less intensive. Specialization in one type 
of care crowds out the ability to deliver the other type of care. This trade-
 o ﬀ is best illustrated in the context of competing treatments for the same 
condition—angioplasty (intensive) versus thrombolytics (less intensive) for 
heart attacks. It is, however, diﬃcult to view EOL spending as being an 
alternative therapy for anything; few physicians view it as being productive 
in almost any setting.
Last, while we have referred to the spillover eﬀects between neighbor-
ing hospitals as “learning,” we have not demonstrated that this is the best 
characterization of the spillover. Competition for local patients could spur 
hospitals to improve their quality more quickly once their neighbors have 
done so, for example. This shorthand masks a number of diﬀerent under-
lying channels for spillovers that will only be distinguishable with further 
research.
7.7    Conclusion
Analysis of the health care sector provides a valuable window into the 
causes of variation in productivity across areas and the role of agglomera-
tion in generating innovation and eﬃciency. This investigation into varia-
tion in the use of high-  value, low-  cost health care and high-  cost, low-  value 
health care has yielded a number of surprising facts. First, there is large 
variation in the use of both innovations but with diﬀerent patterns across 
areas. Variation in the use of high-  quality care is not restricted to certain 
markets—there is variation in care within Boston, Massachusetts, as well as 
within Birmingham, Alabama—but there is much less variation in the use 
of low-  value care within hospital markets. Second, hospitals seem to learn 
from their neighbors about both forms of care at similar rates.
This local diﬀusion has important policy implications. If quality improve-
ments at one hospital diﬀuse to others in the same hospital market, then 
there is a case for subsidizing investment in high- quality care, as this positive 
externality suggests that private investment will be too low. On the other 
hand, if less productive practice patterns also diﬀuse through a similar pro-
cess, then that suggests that hospitals should be discouraged from investing 
in technologically intensive health care of questionable value. These ﬁ  nd-
ings thus have implications both for the optimal design of public subsidiza-
tion of quality- improving investment and for payments for lower- value care 
through public insurance programs like Medicare. Both promoting the use Understanding Agglomerations in Health Care    2 3 5
of underutilized high-  quality care and discouraging the use of overused 
low-  value care would improve the productivity of health care spending. 
Understanding the mechanisms through which these practices diﬀuse and 
the role that agglomeration economies play in that diﬀusion is crucial for 
designing policies that achieve these aims and should further inform the 
design of a wide array of reforms.
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